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COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL ASSESSMENT:
PRACTICE-BASED VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF
NEUROSCIENCE
JOHN T. PHILIPSBORN* & MELISSA HAMILTON**
INTRODUCTION
What follows is a discussion that is meant for judges, forensic mental
health experts, and lawyers whose involvement in criminal cases means,
when necessary, accessing the tools and knowledge to address, analyze, and
respond to evidence of the accused’s alleged incompetence to stand trial.
There is here a discussion of practice guidelines, caselaw, competencerelated orders, commentaries, and recommendations that should be pertinent
when the accused’s competence to stand trial is questionable. Courts, and the
lawyers who appear in such cases, should be aware of the information that
can be offered by neuroscientists from the various fields involved in
researching, assessing, and documenting brain structure and function. This
writing, a combination of a literature review and a commentary that includes
illustrative court orders, is offered by the combination of a practicing lawyer
with more than forty years of criminal case litigation experience, some of it
as counsel of record in competence adjudications and otherwise as a court
qualified lawyer-expert on competence to stand trial, and by an academic
who researches the use of forensic science in the law.
Readers will find here different perspectives on what are touted
elsewhere as leading examples of cases demonstrating the utility of
neuroimaging in competence adjudications. Also offered are examples of
competence adjudications known mainly by practicing lawyers but not yet
discussed in journals. These should be viewed as examples of litigation
conducted by knowledgeable lawyers who effectively blended neuroimaging
and neuroscience testimony with other wide-ranging forms of competence
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related evidence. These case studies are offered to explain how
neuroscientists were called upon in one case to buttress and offer
corroboration for the various psychiatric and neuropsychological
assessments, and in another to detect a structural anomaly in the brain of the
accused that helped provide more specific information about the cause of
impairments detected through other techniques. These case examples support
recently expressed views about the main uses of neuroimaging in criminal
cases as further discussed here.
Two researchers with extensive expertise in the field of mental
disabilities observed that: “there has been almost no consideration of the
application of neuroimaging evidence in the area of criminal law in which
mental status issues play the largest role: that of incompetency to stand
trial.”1 The observation may apply to the majority of competence
assessments, but as will be confirmed in the casework reviewed here,
neuroscience has at times been involved in competence assessments and
adjudications particularly in cases in which lawyers have had the knowledge
and resources to work with neuroscientists. This involvement also requires a
judge willing to permit introduction of the evidence. Some examples of the
involvement of neuroimaging in competence assessments can be found in
proceedings from more than twenty years ago. And practice guidelines for
forensic psychiatric evaluation of competence to stand trial have referenced
the possible use of neuroimaging since 2007. The ‘lack of consideration’
seems to stem in part from the on-going lack of training of lawyers, and some
forensic mental health professionals, in the breadth of methodologies that are
available to help assess the many types of disorders, disabilities, injuries, and
abnormalities that can be at the root of a competence question.
It has often been observed that competence assessments are part of
the routine for those involved in the regular practice of forensic psychology
and forensic psychiatry.2 Yet routine assessments often are not conducted as
thoroughly as recommended in the published competence assessment
guidelines, and according to the processes recommended in some of the
practice literature—both of which are discussed below. In most busy court

1
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, My Brain Is So Wired: Neuroimaging’s
Role in Competency Cases Involving Persons with Mental Disabilities, 27 PUB. INT.
L.J. 73, 95 (2018).
2
Patricia A. Zapf et al., Assessing Competency to Stand Trial, in THE
HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 281, 281 (Irving B. Weiner & Randy K. Otto
eds., 2013).
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systems, a continuum of competence assessments and related discussions
will involve what the outcome of a given case should be, based upon reports
that submitted by the designated competence examiners. A contested
competence-related evidentiary hearing or trial (where competence can be
tried to a court or jury) is a less frequent occurrence. Indeed, even in
jurisdictions where there are specialized mental health courts, contested
hearings involving experts from several disciplines can be a rarity.3 Most
competence-related questions are addressed without profound inquiry, and
without attention to best professional practices.4 The evidence supporting the
claim of incompetence, or undermining it, is often deemed sufficient based
on the reports of one or two examiners to permit the matter to be resolved
short of a prolonged set of hearings. It makes sense that knowledgeable
commentators would describe neuroimaging as an endeavor which has been
too little considered or discussed in competence assessment in general.
Some of the scholarly literature on neuroscience and law addresses
the intersection of the subjects as though it is outside both the frame of
reference of the ‘regular’ professional participants (judges, defense counsel,
prosecutors) in the court systems in the United States.5 And that is all too
often the case. It is likely that part of the reason for the lack of consultation
with or involvement of neuroscientists in competence assessments is that
lawyers who are raising competence questions, and asking for the
appointment of examiners, may not have received advice or training about
multidisciplinary competence-assessment processes. Lawyers who are
current with the breadth of practice literature and training are aware of
competence assessment as a multidisciplinary endeavor and may insist on
approaching specific cases in that manner.6
3

Id. at 288.
Id. at 283 (noting that most states fail to require specific training for mental
health professionals carrying out competence assessments).
5
David Collins, Re-Evaluating Competence to Stand Trial, 82 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 176–80 (2019).
6
United States v. Duhon, 104 F.Supp.2d 663, 669 (W.D. La. 2000) (referencing
the need for input from defense counsel as explained in Michael Burt & John
Philipsborn, Assessment of Client Competence: A Suggested Approach, NACDL
CHAMPION 18 (June 1998)); Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating
Competence to Stand Trial with Evidence-Based Practice, 37 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 450, 459 (2009) (blaming both researchers and practitioners for
polarization that is incompatible with multidisciplinary approaches to competence
4

262

U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y

[Vol. XV No.1

I.
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL – A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
The constitutionally-required definition of competence to stand trial
is found in two decisions of the United States Supreme Court. As the Court
explained in Indiana v. Edwards (2008):7 “The two cases that set forth the
Constitution’s ‘mental competence’ standard…” are Dusky v. United States
(1960) and Drope v. Missouri (1975).8 Dusky specified that the inquiry
regarding competence includes the questions of (1) whether he has “a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him…,” and (2)
whether he “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding.”9 Drope has been referenced as
either adding or clarifying that a person is incompetent if he “lacks the
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him,
to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.”10
In a later ruling, Godinez v. Moran (1993), the Supreme Court ruled
that there is one set of required abilities and capacities that must be
established to exist in a particular person to allow a court to determine that
she, or he, is competent to stand trial.11 The Godinez Court reiterated earlier
requirements set out by the Court that individuals who face criminal charges
are required to have a factual and rational understanding of the criminal
charges at issue and of the court-related proceedings, and they must be able
to make decisions to exercise or give up the rights that the Constitution has
reserved to them in criminal cases.

assessment); The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law (AAPL) makes
reference to jurisdictions that may use multidisciplinary teams as part of a psychiatric
assessment in Section 5.3.1 of the AAPL’s Practice Guideline for the Forensic
Assessment, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S9 (2015). Many different
professional organizations provide training for practicing lawyers. Prosecutors and
defense counsel can attend sessions given by national regional state and local
organizations and offices. There are also practice-related periodicals that carry
articles on a wide variety of topics, including competence assessment. Examples
include the NACDL Champion and ABA Criminal Justice Section’s Criminal
Justice.
7
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170–71 (2008).
8
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162 (1975).
9
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
10
Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added).
11
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
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These basic, constitutionally-rooted rights include the accused’s
right to contest the charges in a trial, or to decide to give up the right to go to
trial and plead guilty. Any accused must have a rational understanding of the
right to trial as well as the right to confront witnesses by being present in
court and cross-examining those witnesses through counsel. These rights also
involve the right to testify, to contest or respond to the charges, or to remain
silent.12 The decision of whether or not to exercise these rights or not rests
exclusively with the accused.
The Supreme Court recognized that individuals who go to trial will
need to make “other strategic choices,” including “whether (and how) to put
on a defense and whether to raise one or more affirmative defenses.”13 While
the Court explained that the fundamental definition of competence “seeks to
ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist
counsel,” it went on to state that “[w]hile psychiatrists and scholars may find
it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while
States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than
the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these
additional requirements.”14
Operationally, the designated experts try to arrive at their opinions
on a defendant’s competence through a combination of evaluations—or,
where only one or two evaluators have been involved, by seeking to assess
particular abilities and capacities, and then tying these to the requirements of
competence. Components of a competence evaluation may involve the
assessment of whether the accused manifests symptoms and hallmarks of a
major mental illness or of an evident intellectual or developmental disability.
The evaluators may then refine the inquiry into the individual’s mental
condition, cognitive abilities, decision-making capacities, learning abilities,
and abilities to communicate. Evaluators may then use standardized
competence tools that could include a semi-structured interview or use of
various competence assessment devices. Next, knowledgeable experts write
a report linking their findings to the legal standards set forth by statutes and
the courts.
The ‘consumers’ of competence evaluations (courts and lawyers) are
interested in information on the validity of performance during assessments
and of symptoms reported. At the same time, these consumers may have an
12

Id. at 397–98.
Id. at 398–99.
14
Id. at 401–02.
13
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interest in being informed about the likely cause(s) of reported impairments,
particularly where the combination of interviewing, record review,
psychometric testing, and competence assessment ‘testing’ leaves some
questions about the basis for the reported impairments unaddressed.
One additional explanation of the legally defined contours of the
competence requirement bears discussion – particularly because the
reference here is to a matter that was recently reexamined by the United
States Supreme Court. This additional matter underscores the relationship
between the legal condition of competence to stand trial and the legally
discussed autonomy that the accused, who is competent, is recognized to
have. This autonomy was discussed again recently in a case that originated
in Louisiana–a death penalty case–McCoy v. Louisiana (2018).15 Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion and explained the following:
Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to
assert innocence belongs in this latter category [of
decisions reserved for the accused]. Just as a defendant
may steadfastly refused to plead guilty in the face of
overwhelming evidence against her, or reject the
assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant’s own
inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so
may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt
phase of a capital trial. These are not strategic choices
about how best to achieve a client’s objectives; they are
choices about what the client’s objectives in fact are.16
The McCoy Court further explained that: “[w]hen a client expressly asserts
that the objective of ‘his defense’ is to maintain innocence of the charged
criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override
it by conceding guilt.”17
McCoy makes it clear that the consequences of a ruling that the
accused is competent can be highly significant. As with the patient in a
hospital setting who is deemed competent to refuse treatment, the accused
who decides to stake out a position in a criminal case against the advice of a
lawyer may well live (or die) as a consequence of that decision. For lawyers
15

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018).
Id. at 1508–09 (emphasis in original).
17
Id. at 1509–10 (citing the Sixth Amendment and the 2016 ABA Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (a “lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of the representation….”)).
16
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in capital cases, or in other cases that may result in lengthy sentences, where
there is a doubt about the accused’s competence, due diligence will militate
in favor of at least getting advice about the best competence evaluation
practices applicable to the client and case—which may result in a
recommendation of consultation with a neuroscientist resulting in
neuroimaging or other procedures.
In competence cases, courts seek information and guidance on how
a particular disorder, deficit, or symptom is related to one of the elements of
the competence definitions in Supreme Court precedent and in the
jurisdiction in question.18 In addition, the question of concern to a court is to
assess ‘how real’ the problem described is and the extent to which it has been
verified.19 Those are matters on which neuroscientists of various kinds may
be consulted not because only they have the most persuasive information
available, but because they may add some additional case-related data and
general information for consideration in addressing the legal decisions that a
court will make.

II.
THE HEARTLAND OF COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT PRACTICE
The output of a routine competence to stand trial assessment is likely
to take the form of a report that may have been prepared by an examiner, a
few reports, or perhaps a composite report from a group of examiners if the
accused has been evaluated in a hospital setting. The examiner(s) are likely
to include a psychiatrist or a psychologist. In a few jurisdictions, the
examiner could be a social worker or a doctoral-level trainee. The report may
reflect an interview process conducted over a period of some hours or, in the
instance of more thorough evaluations, over a period of days or weeks
(particularly if the accused is ordered to be evaluated in a state hospital or
locked ward setting). The report is likely to cover: the charges; some aspect
of the background of the case; aspects of the accused’s personal, social,
medical, psychiatric, and psychological history; descriptions of prior
hospitalizations and courses of psychotropic medications; and history of head
18
Andrew D. Reisner & Jennifer L. Piel, Mental Condition Requirement in
Competency to Stand Trial Requirements, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 86,
88–89 (2018).
19
Barry W. Wall et al., AAPL Practice Resource for the Forensic Psychiatric
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S4,
S21 (Supp. 2018).
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injuries.20 The report is also likely to contain some information about
diagnostic impressions or, in some jurisdictions, a statement of the diagnosis
with reference to DSM-5 or another commonly referenced authoritative
publication.21 Competence assessments will often reference the examiners’
attention to performance and symptom validity issues, and may either
conclude with a specific opinion about the accused’s competence or
incompetence to stand trial.22 Where the opinion is in favor of incompetence,
the findings may be accompanied in some reports by recommendations for
further treatment, medication, or remedial support.23 If the opinion is in favor
of competence, there may be cautionary notes about circumstances under
which the accused may decompensate.
Publications covering forensic assessment in criminal cases describe
competence-related assessment as “arguably the most common type of
involvement of forensic mental health professionals in the justice system.”24
The assessment of the accused in a criminal case whose competence was in
question was, for a number of years, usually performed in a state hospital or
another in-patient setting until laws and procedures were changed:
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, bolstered by
research indicating that competence evaluations
conducted by psychiatrists are no better than evaluations
conducted by other mental health professionals, states
increasingly authorized psychologists and social workers
to perform competence examinations – a trend that
facilitated the decentralization of forensic systems by
expanding locally available forensic resources.25
Depending on the training, licensure, qualifications, and experience
of the examiner, competence evaluations may combine the examiner’s
inquiry into: (1) present symptoms of mental disorder and any diagnosis (2)

20

Carla A. Lourenco, Evaluating Competence to Stand Trial, in
PSYCHOLOGISTS’ DESK REFERENCE 609, 610 (Gerald P. Koocher et al. eds., 2013).
21
CHARLES SCOTT, DSM-5 AND THE LAW: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES, 110–
11 (2015).
22
Lourenco, supra note 20, at 611.
23
Id.
24
PATRICIA A. ZAPF & RONALD ROESCH, EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE TO
STAND TRIAL 3 (2009).
25
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:
A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 130 (4th ed.
2018).
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standardized psychological testing to assess aspects of functioning, and (3)
competence-specific inquiry. Publications aimed at forensic psychiatric
assessment (by psychiatrists) will establish “a baseline regarding a
defendant’s general abilities and functioning…[and] ask questions
specifically related to trial competency.”26
For a considerable time, competence assessment was an
unstandardized endeavor, guided mainly by the individualized practices of
the examiner.27 The initially ‘systematized’ inquiries may, or may not, have
used checklists.28 By 1965, at least one checklist “intended for use by
psychiatrists in providing a brief, convenient review of areas for investigation
in evaluating whether a patient can be considered competent to stand trial or
must be considered incompetent by reason of intellectual or mental defect”
had been published.29 Shortly thereafter, however, a series of well-known
publications told courts, lawyers, and mental health professionals that
“despite the ever-increasing utilization of psychiatric and psychological
evidence in the legal process, such evidence frequently does not meet
reasonable criteria of admissibility, and should not be admitted in a court of
law, and if admitted, should be given little or no weight.”30 And, beginning
in the 1970s, interested psychiatrists and psychologists organized and
advanced the field of forensic mental health evaluation.
Those who led the efforts were motivated by various critiques of the
then-current system: few thoughtfully developed standardized practices in
forensic assessment; vague professional standards; a field unmoored from to
the questions at issue in the legal system; and little available ongoing and
specialized training.31 Neither the mental health professionals conducting

26

THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 266 (Liza H. Gold & Richard L. Friersen eds., 3rd ed. 2018).
27
Loren E. Mallory & Michelle R. Guyton, Competency to Stand Trial and
Criminal Responsibility in Forensic Neuropsychology Practice, in APA HANDBOOK
OF FORENSIC NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 341, 347 (Shane S. Bush ed., 2017).
28
Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Viljoen, Issues and Considerations Regarding the
Use of Assessment Instruments in the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial, 21
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 351, 353 (2003).
29
Ames Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for
Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 616, 617 (1965).
30
JAY ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 1
(5th ed. 1995) (citing Ziskin’s 1970 First Edition).
31
Jennifer L. Skeem & Stephen L. Golding, Community Examiners' Evaluations
of Competence to Stand Trial: Common Problems and Suggestions for Improvement,
29 PROF. PSYCHOL. 357, 364 (1998).
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examinations nor the lawyers offering mental health evidence had sufficient
knowledge of one another’s fields to ensure that the courts were being
provided with legally relevant and useful mental health assessment
information.32 There were increasing calls for improvements, such as:
specialized training and education; the creation of professional organizations
devoted to the endeavor; the need for further research and development of
specialized tools; and standardized methodologies.33 These developments
resonated with groups of researchers, academics, and mental health
professionals who had been concerned about the need for a research-based,
empirically validated approach to forensic assessment. In part because the
assessment of competence to stand trial was recognized to be the most
frequently called upon form of forensic mental health assessment in state and
federal criminal courts, in the 1990s a cadre of psychologists, social
scientists, and law school faculty researched the theoretical framework for
some of the competence assessment tools that are in common use today.34
One of the contributions to the advancement of forensic mental
health assessment as a field was the development of the MacArthur
Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication (“MacCAT-CA”).
Others added to the development of standardized assessment tools that
focused on the assessment of abilities, capacities, and basic knowledge of
legal processes that are discussed in decisions where the United States
Supreme Court set forth the requirement of competence to stand trial.35 The
more elaborate and well-developed competency assessment tools take the
form of structured or semi-structured interviews that may use differing
approaches to provide examiners data on the accused’s competence.
MacCAT-CA uses a vignette describing a hypothetical crime as the
32
Robert A. Nicholson et al., A Comparison of Instruments Competency to Stand
Trial,
12
LAW
&
HUM.
BEV.
313,
313
(1988),
https://idp.springer.com/authorize/casa?redirect_uri=https://link.springer.com/conte
nt/pdf/10.1007/BF01044387.pdf&casa_token=Cuo13pjopAwAAAAA:Y5zIIVDft
MV5DDbbv-1ZmUnDls5AKlAiT5eCmxn3v1ScZIUOhOPCeqwr4ge9cPbhsxpcctXaw1oNUTi.
33
Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating Competence to Stand Trial
with Evidence-Based Practice, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 450, 453 (2009).
34
See generally Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A
Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992); Steven K. Hoge et al.,
The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: Development and Validation of a
Research Instrument, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141 (1997).
35
Deborah K. Cooper & Thomas Grisso, Five Year Research Update (19911995): Evaluations for Competence to Stand Trial, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 347 (1997).
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platform to assess what the coauthors of the tool describe as, three
competence-related abilities: understanding, reasoning, and appreciation.36
The Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial – Revised (“ECST-R”) has a
different structure and underlying methodology, built around what the
authors have described as separate dimensions of competence to stand trial,
with included items and scales for atypical presentation, as well as some
inquiry into case-specific information.37
The competence assessment tools just mentioned are only two
among many tools, inventories, and devices used by forensic examiners
during competence assessments. A basic orientation to the subject of
competence assessment mentions twelve different competence-related
tools,38 though this represents only a small fraction of the various competence
assessment questionnaires, interviews, and tools in use today.
As this piece is written, the combination of forensic examiners in
private practice throughout the United States; local and county forensic
mental health components; state hospitals; locked mental health facilities,
and the like, have developed their own ‘packages’ of competence
assessment-related materials which may include some of the published
inventories/structured interviews as well as inventories that emphasize local
or state approaches to competence evaluation. Some large facilities have
been involved in the competence assessment endeavor for years. For
example, the California State Hospital system and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons medical facilities disseminate policy statements concerning forensic
examinations; have procedure manuals covering competence evaluations;
training circulars covering the same topic; and, in certain areas,
administrative regulations and other legal requirements for the level of
training of competence examiners and for the need for some level of
systematized competence assessment process.39
36
STEVEN K. HOGE ET AL., THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL
– CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION (1999).
37
RICHARD ROGERS ET AL., EVALUATION OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL –
REVISED (2004).
38
Melton et al., supra note 25, at 141–51.
39
For example, California Penal Code § 1369(h)(1) (West 2019) provides that
California’s State Department of State Hospitals “…shall adopt guidelines for
education and training standards for a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to be
considered for appointment by the court pursuant to this section [pertinent to ‘mental
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Currently, a wide variety of materials - from book-length treatments,
to journal articles, to practice guides of various kinds - offer guidance to
psychiatrists and psychologists who are regularly involved in the assessment
of competence to stand trial. Many of these guides used models that were
developed during the 1990s and now provide nuanced discussions of
assessment approaches.40

III.
THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN ADDRESSING QUESTIONS OF THE
ACCUSED’S INCOMPETENCE
Many of the statutes enacted to provide a mechanism for a court to
address questions of the accused’s competence to stand trial place the burden
of raising the issue on the litigating attorneys and the presiding judge. As an
illustration, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) specifies that:
[T]he defendant or the attorney for the Government may
file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental
competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the
motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion,
if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant
may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of
the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.
There are various scenarios that result in the signaling of a concern to the
attorneys/judge about the accused’s possible incompetence to stand trial

competence’].” The same statute provides for the creation of a working group
representing parts of the criminal court system, including judges, various lawyers,
advocates for those with mental disabilities, psychologists, psychiatrists, and related
professional associations.
40
One example of a nuanced discussion is provided by a well-known contributor
to the development of competence assessment approaches. THOMAS GRISSO,
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL EVALUATIONS: JUST THE BASICS (2014). In his
introduction, Dr. Grisso explained that his aim with this guide, one of many
publications that he has authored or coauthored, was that this publication might be
considered a good starting place: “[b]ecause of its simplicity. It offers less detail and
avoids many of the complexities that can arise across competence cases. So it allows
you to see the forest before you start inspecting the trees.” Id. at iii. Another example
of a practice guide is ZAPF & ROESCH, supra note 24.
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(interactions with counsel, acting out in court, observations made by jail staff,
reports from family members, etc.).
Defense lawyers often initiate competence litigation after interaction
with their clients. According to prevailing practice standards, and the laws in
some jurisdictions, counsel have an obligation to communicate with their
clients about the case generally, and about the consequences of the case (in
terms of outcomes, sentences, and collateral consequences). Defense lawyers
are—assuming sufficient experience and knowledge—ideally placed to
begin the evaluation of the accused’s level of factual and rational
understanding of the proceedings, and of the case. Lawyers will often be the
first, and sometimes the only, person who communicates the breadth of
decisions that the accused has available, and what strategies may be
employed to achieve the desired outcomes (as well as assessing the
probabilities of possible outcomes). These communications should
(assuming informed and invested lawyers) yield an initial database on how
the accused matches up with the legal requirements of competence.
Indeed, several courts have concluded that where defense counsel is
on notice that a client may be incompetent, he or she has a duty to raise the
question of the accused’s competence so that it can be addressed by the court.
Then, once counsel raises the competence issue, the defense counsel has a
unique role to play. The United States Supreme Court has explained that:
“judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [competence] issues
into focus”41 and “defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of
the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense.”42
Consequently, these types of criminal cases thrust lawyers into a
field involving the intersection of law and mental health. As noted, defense
counsel spend time with the accused during the pendency of the case. While
prosecutors are not likely to speak directly with the accused, experienced
prosecutors will have collected information about the defendant, and will tap
information from witnesses, investigators, jailers, and others about the
accused. These scenarios entail challenges where lawyers are not trained in
the basics of mental health assessment. And they also explain why some
lawyers with extensive training and experience in forensic mental health
issues are more likely to reach out to neuroscientists (in addition to other
forensic mental health professionals) when the accused manifests certain
disabilities or impairments.
41
42

Drope, 420 U.S. at 176–77.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449–50 (1992).
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So, how might legal practitioners become sufficiently
knowledgeable to effectively litigate competency issues, particularly in terms
of both the law and science? The question is particularly salient for defense
counsel because of their ethical burden to provide the accused effective
representation according to prevailing professional practices.43 Attorneys
may now look to several sources for guidance on competency assessment
litigation, including sources written more from the legal perspective.
Notably, the professional training models for competency targeted to the
legal professional are not at the same level of practical information and
guidance as those that have long been provided to forensic mental health
professionals. In 2016, the ABA adopted its fourth set of Criminal Justice
Standards on Mental Health.44 These standards reference current literature,
like the DSM-5, and set forth a combination of aspirational and practicerelated standards and guidelines, including approaches to the assessment of
competence to stand trial. There is an entire set of standards covering
“competence to proceed.”45 Judges may access state or local bench books,
which may have basic information on competence proceedings.46
Criminal lawyers who wish to obtain further education and training
may seek specialized training—and some defense offices, bar programs,
prosecutors’ offices, or courts may require that lawyers working with them
obtain relevant, advanced skills. For example, in the past thirty years, a
combination of national organizations (including the National District
Attorneys Association, the American Bar Association, the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others) have presented a wide
variety of continuing education programs on forensic mental health issues.47
The American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological
Association, and their forensic psychiatry and psychology sections, offer
43

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH (2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standa
rds/mental_health_standards_2016.authcheckdam.pdf.
45
ABA CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD 7-4.1 (2016).
46
See, e.g., UNC SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK (2015), https://benchbook.sog.unc.edu/criminal/capacity-proceed;
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (6th ed.
2013).
47
One example is the 1994 ABA symposium on psychological expertise and
criminal justice, described in the three-volume syllabus as: “A conference for
psychologists and lawyers jointly sponsored by the American Psychological
Association and the Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association.”
44

2021]

Competence to Stand Trial Assessment

273

training provided by the combination of experienced professionals in various
fields, including psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, as well as from
experienced lawyers who have addressed matters involved in the assessment
and determination of a person’s competence to stand trial. One explanation
for the rise of these types of specialist education and training generally
derives from the role that mental health issues have played in capital cases
specifically since the death penalty was revived in the 1970s with significant
due process protections.
This background is relevant to understanding lawyers’ (and judges’)
interest, particularly those already knowledgeable about mental health issues
in the law, in learning where neuroscience may inform a determination (and
assessment) of competence to stand trial. What has been lacking in the
current commentary on neuroscience and law, particularly that written by
full-time academics, is an understanding of how case work is actually done
by lawyers who have varying degrees of expertise and training on matters
like forensic mental health assessment. While a small proportion of licensed
lawyers attend law school after having received training and a terminal
degree in medicine or psychology, the vast majority are dependent on a
variety of ad hoc training and continuing education programs, as well as both
experiential learning and advice from colleagues, in developing their
approaches to clients (or for prosecutors, to defendants) with mental health
issues. In established public defender offices, lawyers may shadow their
more experienced colleagues to learn how specific issues are addressed in
that jurisdiction. As lawyers acquire experience and information through case
work, they will face varying challenges that may include an accused who
appears incompetent or who may have a history of psychiatric treatment and
hospitalizations. These situations often lead to interaction with forensic
mental health experts from various professions, and concurrent review of
pertinent literature. It is not unusual for experienced lawyers who have
worked with a wide variety of medical and mental health experts to have been
introduced to neuroscientists and the tools of neuroscience used by
researchers and clinicians.
At the same time, some of the lawyers involved in sophisticated
litigation have shared their expertise with their colleagues in training sessions
and in publications such that there is now a small cadre of lawyers who have
been recognized in the profession as having an understanding of the available
best practices in competence litigation. This has also led to the development
of a select group of lawyers who, at times, are called upon (and permitted) to
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testify as experts in courtroom proceedings on various aspects of competence
issues.48 It is also one of the factors that has led to an expanded role for
neuroscientists in cases that call for a multidisciplinary assessment
framework. At the same time, however, as is true in any number of
professions—lawyers who do not pursue available information and training
or happen to practice in jurisdictions that do not emphasize attention to
professional development will often fail to consider the basic tools necessary
to adequately represent their clients in addressing competence issues.

IV.
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT APPROACHES IN EVALUATIONS OF
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL
A federal judge observed in a ruling in a competence adjudication,
“that a multi-disciplinary approach is often critical in resolving competency
issues.”49 Knowledgeable experts and lawyers concur with this observation.
Some of the reasoning for courts and lawyers to seek and obtain information
beyond that offered by a routine competence evaluation conducted by a
psychiatrist or a psychologist (or even pairings of such experts) can be found
in some of the literature that discusses research into competence
adjudications in criminal courts. Researchers have noted that “the majority
48
See, e.g., the discussion in Duhon, where one of the operative questions was
whether there was reliable expert opinion available through examiners at the Federal
Bureau of Prisons that the accused had been restored to competence. 104 F.Supp.2d
663. The ruling is one of the few that dissects in some detail the legal structure of the
concept of competence and the analytical framework for deciding whether
examining experts have actually addressed the issues that are asked as a result of the
law. The court in that case cited an example of practice literature written for lawyers
that is not the focus of this article, in which the court referenced the writings of two
defense lawyers, noting that where the focus of the court’s determination is on a
defendant’s ability to assist counsel “‘one of the most evident issues is whether the
assessing professional, usually a psychiatrist or psychologist, really knows what
would normally go into the defense of the case.’” Id. at 669 n.21 (citing Burt &
Philipsborn, supra note 6). Another example of practice literature that has been
referenced by lawyers is John Philipsborn, Competently Lawyering Competence: The
Role and Duties of a Lawyer in Addressing Competence to Stand Trial Where the
Questions Are Focused on Client Communication and Capacity to Assist, CRIM.
JUST.
34
(Fall
2017),
https://www.academia.edu/37881121/The_Role_and_Duties_of_a_Lawyer_in_Add
ressing_Competence_to_Stand_Trial_Where_the_Questions_Are_Focused_on_Cli
ent_Communication_and_Capacity_to_Assist.
49
Duhon, 104 F.Supp.2d at 699.
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of hearings [on competence questions] last only a few minutes and are held
simply to confirm the findings of evaluators…[and in most cases] the court
accepts the recommendations of the evaluators.”50 According to published
research, well-trained forensic mental-health evaluators using the same semistructured competence assessment tools and standardized instruments have
high rates of agreement on whether given subjects are competent or not.
However, other researchers have revealed that evaluators at times do disagree
on the deficits that have been uncovered or described by a competency
assessment process.51 “It is the more difficult decisions, involving cases
where competency is truly a serious question, that are of concern. How
reliable are decisions about these cases? To date, no study has accumulated
enough of these cases to answer this question.”52
In light of potentially conflicting expert opinions, as well as in the
more difficult or complicated cases, lawyers and mental health experts who
are able to follow best practices (which can be an aspiration limited by the
financial realities attending a case) will push for multidisciplinary
involvement in cases where there is a need to provide the court with a wider
spectrum of information on competency than is typical. The lawyer might
seek to consult with a neuropsychiatrist who has extensive experience in
competence assessment, a behavioral neurologist, or an expert on
neuroimaging and the aging brain.53 One example of a situation in which an
experienced judge may raise the need for further evaluations or may suggest
the need for a greater breadth of expertise is where existing reports indicate
that the accused’s competence may ‘come and go’ – particularly where the
accused has been medicated and there are questions raised about her/his

50
Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Mental Competency Evaluations:
Guidelines for Judges and Attorneys, CT. REV. 28, 29 (Summer 2000).
51
On the first of the points made, see Zapf & Roesch, supra note 50, at 29; on
the second point, dealing with research demonstrating the lack of agreement between
evaluators on deficits uncovered by competency evaluation procedures, see Jennifer
Skeem et al., The Logic and Reliability of Evaluations of Competence to Stand Trial,
22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 519 (1998).
52
Zapf & Roesch, supra note 50, at 30.
53
James H. Cole et al., Brain Age and Other Bodily ‘Ages’: Implication for
Neuropsychiatry, 24 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 266 (2019); Mia Anthony & Feng
Lin, A Systematic Review for Functional Imaging Studies of Cognitive Reserve
Across the Cognitive Aging Spectrum, 33 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCH. 937
(2017).
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response to medication.54 Such cases will often be ‘staffed’ by examining
forensic psychiatrists and forensic psychologists, together with
neuropsychologists and neuroscientists whose involvement may result in the
use of one or more types of neuroimaging studies.
Still, the multi-disciplinary approach requires even more care toward
properly educating the litigators and judges on the expanded nature of the
assessment and on the more complicated forensic sciences involved.
Expanding the circle of experts may also signal that extensive record
collection has occurred along with more extensive than routine investigation
of the accused’s history: family; education; medical; social; institutional;
behavioral; and legal. The increased complexity of a competence evaluation
may raise questions about the extent to which judges and lawyers are able, in
their capacity as consumers, to appreciate and understand the strengths and
weaknesses of particular competence assessment paradigms.55
Knowledgeable judges have expressed concern in certain instances that the
experts’ reports submitted on the issue of competence are not providing
sufficient methodological information or supporting data for the judge to be
satisfied that an appropriate ruling can be entered. Lawyers may be
concerned to anticipate the view that ‘interview and testing’ methods are not
convincing to a particular court.

V.
THE WIDE ARRAY OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE DISCUSSIONS
The role of neuroscience to help answer legal issues is novel and
brings unique challenges. The Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence (3d ed.), published in 2011, covers a wide range of
subjects that arise in litigation, including neuroscience.56 The preface to the
Reference Manual notes that the introduction of such sophisticated scientific
methods, such as neuroscience, requires judges to improve their knowledge
bases as a result:

54

Sheldon H. Preskorn, Prediction of Individual Response to Antidepressants
and Antipsychotics: An Integral Concept, 16 DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE
545 (2014).
55
Authors have written about these concerns over a period of time. See, e.g.,
Jennifer L. Skeem, Stephen L. Golding, Nancy B. Cohen, & Gerald Berge, Logic
and Reliability of Evaluations of Competence to Stand Trial, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
519, 540–47 (1998).
56
Federal Judicial Center, supra note 46, at xvii.
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Supreme Court decisions during the last decade of the
twentieth century mandated that federal courts examined
the scientific basis of expert testimony to ensure that it
meets the same rigorous standard employed by scientific
researchers and practitioners outside the courtroom.
Needless to say, this requirement places a demand on
judges not only to comprehend the complexities of
modern science but to adjudicate between parties’
differing interpretations of scientific evidence. Science,
meanwhile, advances. Methods change, new fields are
born, new tests are introduced, the lexicon expands, and
fresh approaches to the interpretation of causal relations
evolve. Familiar terms such as enzymes and molecules are
replaced by microarray expression and nanotubes; singleauthor research studies have now become multiinstitutional, multi-author, international collaborative
efforts.57
The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and
Neuroscience website publishes a graph on the same page as the ‘Law and
Neuroscience Bibliography,’ showing a rise in the number of publications on
law and neuroscience from 1984 to 2019. The number arcs upwards
beginning around 2004, when there were around 100 publications, to more
than 1,800 in 2019.58 By 2015, a combination of journalism, scholarship,
commentary, and case law helped explain that brain imaging studies, brainrelated metabolic and genetic studies, and explanations of brain structure and
function coming from professionals whose credentials link them to the
various disciplines in the neurosciences had all made appearances in courts
in the United States.59
At this point in time, neuroscience and law have a relationship. There

57

Id. at xiii.
Vanderbilt University hosts the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Law and Neuroscience, whose publications and publication graph can be found at
https://www.lawneuro.org/bibliography.php.
59
See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in U.S.
Criminal Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485 (2015) (illustrating
academic research on the use of neuroscience evidence in courts); see also KEVIN
DAVIS, THE BRAIN DEFENSE: MURDER IN MANHATTAN AND THE DAWN OF
NEUROSCIENCE IN AMERICA’S COURTROOM (2017) (showing an example of a
journalist’s review of neuroscience and the law).
58
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is a body of literature on the subject. An informal search of academic
programs in the United States and Canada reveals more than sixty
universities and colleges that house departments, institutes, or courses
addressing some variation of neuroscience and law. There are now senior
academics involved in researching, teaching, and publishing on the subject.
Students at the undergraduate and graduate level can study the subjects
conjunctively.
In 2018, the National Academy of Sciences published a report titled
Neuroforensics: Exploring the Legal Implications of Emerging
Neurotechnologies. The report, in the form of a short book, discussed the
many subjects related to legal issues addressed by courts in which courts have
allowed neuroscience-related evidence, and the potential for such evidence
in the future. At this point, there have been a number of publications that
have reiterated information about the proliferation – the noticeable,
exponential growth – of law and neuroscience writing, and an almost equally
impressive proliferation in the United States of university departments,
graduate studies, certificates, and degrees in law and neuroscience.
Interdisciplinary groups of writers have lent their knowledge to
discussions of neuroscience in courts, explaining the strengths and
weaknesses of the various imaging technologies that were the subject of
discussion in court settings. In 2013, one such group summed up the state of
affairs by explaining:
The ability of neuroscientific techniques to shed light on
important aspects of human cognition has generated hope
that neuroscience can help to answer some perennial
questions in courts of law. However, one should keep in
mind that it is easier to misunderstand or misapply
neuroscience data than it is to understand and apply them
correctly, and this is crucially important when lives and
livelihoods depend on it. Whether courts can successfully
navigate these challenging waters will depend on the level
of engagement by neuroscientists.60
This language is particularly interesting given that the Dean of one
prominent law school and a faculty member who teaches neuroscience and
law at another school coauthored the article. Their suggestion seems to ignore
60

Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE 730, 735 (2013),
https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2093&context=f
aculty-publications.
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that developing bodies of knowledge and the advent of new technologies are
inevitable in the business of the courts. Cautionary notes about not allowing
speculative theories and unreliable methodologies are a concern in court
proceedings. Case law, along with statutes and rules, discuss these concerns
and address them in varying ways that allow courts to exclude irrelevant or
unreliable evidence.
Periodically, some major development reminds the legal community
of the need to give attention to the quality and utility of science and technical
knowledge in courts. That was part of what prompted and has accompanied
the publication of the 2009 report of the National Research Council entitled
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. That
report, covering a number of areas of the forensic bench sciences,
identification sciences, and death investigations, has been associated with a
wide variety of efforts to improve training for forensic scientists (and
members of the legal profession) and to underscore the need for attention to
the use of valid and reliable methods in a number of areas of scientific and
technical crime-related endeavors. Judges and lawyers on both sides are
generally aware that any number of half-baked bits of ‘science’ have crept
into court proceedings and are aware as well that members of the legal
profession have aided and abetted the use of nonsense and ‘bad science’ in
courts, with some of the ‘experts’ willing to peddle this bad science.

VI.
NEUROIMAGING AS PART OF A COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN
DISCUSSED FOR YEARS
While some of the more recent scholarship on neuroscience in the
courtroom (cited above) has managed to refer to the consideration of
neuroimaging in an assessment process, the reality is that the encouragement
for practitioners considering neuroimaging studies as potentially informative
in competence inquiries has been available for years.
In her overview of neuroscience evidence in reported (and
unreported) cases in the United States, Professor Nita Farahany explained
that ‘neurobiological’ evidence on the question of competence to stand trial
has been introduced in court proceedings over a period of years. The subject
of competence to stand trial surfaced in twenty percent of the non-capital
cases and nine percent of the capital cases reported by a study that she
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reviewed.61 Dr. John Meixner focused on the subject at hand in a relatively
recent article, titled Neuroscience and Mental Competency: Current Uses
and Future Potential.62 Professor Farahany and Dr. Meixner are mentioned
by name here because their scholarship is among the rare publications that,
along with the writings of Professor Michael Perlin, have examined the
relationship between neuroscience and the adjudication of competence to
stand trial. Professor Perlin, who is quoted above as underscoring the lack of
consideration of neuroimaging evidence in competence to stand trial
inquiries, stands alone in this small group as having researched and written
on competence issues over a period of years, having addressed mental
disabilities and related legal issues as a practitioner and scholar for years.63
In 2007, the predominant professional organization for forensic
psychiatrists affiliated with the American Psychiatric Association, the
American Academy of Psychiatry and Law (“AAPL”), published its Practice
Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand
Trial.64 The coauthors of this Practice Guideline (twelve physicians and
psychiatrists, many with academic affiliations) explain the potential for a
multi-disciplinary assessment, including neuroscience: “If psychological
consultation, imaging studies, or laboratory tests are needed to support an
opinion, the psychiatrist should discuss the need for the examinations with
the retaining attorney before arranging for them to be performed.”65 The same
guideline covers the background material that should be explained in a report
on competence assessment and the guideline specifies: “[f]indings from a
physical examination, imaging studies, or laboratory tests should be included
61

Farahany, supra note 59, at 496 n.2 (including the illustration and data
summarized in graph number 6). Professor Farahany distinguished between cases
focused on competence to stand trial as distinguished from those involving
competence to plead guilty. This distinction, according to the United States Supreme
Court in Godinez, 509 U.S. 389, does not exist under the Due Process-related
competence standard. The comment here is not intended to indicate that Professor
Farahany erred in her discussion, since it appears that she distinguished between
competence to stand trial and competence to plead guilty for the purposes of giving
differing examples of neuroscience evidence in proceedings.
62
John B. Meixner Jr., Neuroscience and Mental Competency: Current Uses
and Future Potential, 81 ALBANY L. REV. 995 (2018).
63
See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 1, at 73, n.1; MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL.,
COMPETENCE IN THE LAW: FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION (2008).
64
See generally Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guidelines for the
Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. S3 (Supp. 2007).
65
Id. at S28 (emphasis added).
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when they play a role in guiding the psychiatrist’s opinion.”66
In 2018, the AAPL issued a ‘Practice Resource’ for the evaluation of
competence to stand trial by psychiatrists. In it, attention to imaging studies,
as specified in the 2007 Practice Guideline, was restated.67 The AAPL’s
Practice Guideline with the 2018 Practice Resource is clearly intended to
provide guidance on practices related to the assessment of competence to
stand trial. The introduction in the 2007 Practice Guideline and the 2018
Practice Resource are similar: “it reflects a consensus among members and
experts about the principles and practice applicable to the conduct of
evaluations of competence to stand trial.”68 Neither of these published
resources appears to have been mentioned to date in the scholarship that
purports to discuss competence assessments as part of a neuroscience and
law overview.
The American Psychiatric Association Publishing Textbook of
Forensic Psychiatry (3d ed.) contains an entire chapter on “Neuroimaging
and Forensic Psychiatry.” Pertinent to the discussion that follows here, the
coauthors of the chapter, Drs. Judith Edersheim and Marlynn Wei,
specifically cover the subject of ‘neuroimaging and criminal competencies.’
In discussing the subject, these coauthors explain: “[n]euroimaging
techniques, particularly when combined with collateral psychological and
neuropsychological testing, can help identify the existence of structural or
functional brain abnormalities that might cause deficits in the fundamental
abilities associated with competence to stand trial.”69
While this type of fine print might be lost on individuals whose focus
is on panoramic scholarly research about neuroscience and law, it is not lost
on knowledgeable psychiatrists, neurologists, or neuropsychologists who are
conducting assessments of competence, or on lawyers who are either
presenting that expert or preparing to cross-examine an expert who is familiar
with the practice literature and with contemporary best practices.

66

Id. at S48.
Wall et al., supra note 19, at S29 (“Findings from a physical examination,
imaging studies, or laboratory tests should be included [in a report] when they play
a role in guiding the psychiatrist’s opinion.”).
68
Id. at S4.
69
Judith Edersheim & Marlynn Wei, Neuroimaging and Forensic Psychiatry,
in TEXTBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 94 (3d ed. 2018).
67
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VII.

A REVIEW OF SOME COMPETENCE-RELATED LITIGATION INVOLVING
DISCUSSION OF NEUROIMAGING
Disappointingly, some of the discussion of the use of neuroimaging
in competence assessment cases has not centered on an understanding of
what courts made of the evidence or on the reasoning that lawyers may have
had for presenting neuroimaging evidence.70 We review four relevant cases
here to provide examples of the varying ways that neuroscience and
neuroimaging evidence has been received in competence adjudications. Two
of the cases have been cited and discussed elsewhere, though in one instance
commentators have failed to discuss the full history of the litigation—which,
if fully reviewed, provides an example of a judge deciding for, and later
against, the accused’s claim of incompetence based largely on contradictory
evidence about the implications of neuroimaging studies. The two other cases
selected have not been discussed elsewhere, and they were chosen in part
because of the adherence to best practices in competence litigation by the
defense counsel involved, as well as because of the amount of time that was
devoted to the overall competence litigation involved.
The first of our chosen cases that has been singled out by
commentators as informative about neuroscience in competence assessment
is one in which a well-known senior federal district court judge considered
the breadth of information on the accused’s competence yet found
insufficient evidence to support the defense’s claim of incompetence
attributed to dementia. The case in point is well known in lawyering and
forensic mental health training circles now because the accused Vincent ‘The
Chin’ Gigante challenged his conviction by offering opinions from eight or
more mental health experts attempting to show his incompetence at the time
of trial and afterward. Eventually, he admitted falsifying his mental state,
with a salient news headline reporting the final result: “[a]fter nearly a
quarter-century of public craziness, Gigante calmly pleaded guilty to
obstruction of justice for his deception.”71

70
Id. (offering useful observations on neuroimaging and competencies in
criminal cases and incomplete discussions of United States v. Gigante and United
States v. Kasim as explained here).
71
Richard Pyle, Vincent ‘The Chin’ Gigante, 77: Mob Chief Faked Mental
Illness in Bid to Avoid Prison, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2005),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-dec-20-me-gigante20-story.html.
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The case, involving Vincent Gigante’s prosecution by federal
authorities in the Eastern District of New York, is one in which there were
charges (and eventual convictions) of racketeering and conspiracy.72 Both
during the course of the pre-verdict development of the case, and then after
the jury rendered a verdict, the defense sought to establish Mr. Gigante’s
incompetence to stand trial. The defense had placed before the judge multiple
evaluation reports and expert opinions that Mr. Gigante suffered “from
dementia, paranoia, and perhaps Alzheimer’s Disease and that he has been
mentally incompetent since the mid-1980s.”73 The Government argued that
the evidence was not persuasive and raised concerns about symptom validity
and diagnostic error. The final reiterations of the claims of incompetence
resulted in two published orders that discussed the evidence in detail. The
first order described the showing of incompetence and listed eight experts for
the defense, most of whom were board certified psychiatrists. The roster of
government experts consisted of two physicians with multiple degrees and a
psychologist. Medical and psychological examiners from the Federal Bureau
of Prisons who had examined Mr. Gigante in an authorized setting also
submitted competence reports. Two lay witnesses also testified about their
observations of Mr. Gigante.74 Neuroimaging studies were introduced as part
of the effort to substantiate a diagnosis of dementia.
The Gigante competence hearings are still referenced as examples of
instances in which well-known mental health professionals, including
established medical school faculty members considered to be leading
psychiatrists, together with a pioneer in neuroimaging research, left the judge
unpersuaded by the claim of incompetence given the weight of evidence
undermining the claim—a development later buttressed by Mr. Gigante’s
admission of having engaged in deception concerning his mental condition.75
One of the rulings notes that some of the evidence offered by the
72

United States. v. Gigante, 982 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 166 F.3d
75 (2d Cir. 1999).
73
Id. at 173–74.
74
In addition to the December 1997 Order cited above, Judge Weinstein also
decided Gigante, 982 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), at the end of October 1997. In
sum, in the space of approximately two months, Judge Weinstein had written two
extensive memoranda discussing the competence-related evidence and litigation in
the Gigante case.
75
Nathan J. Kolla & Jonathan D. Brodie, Application of Neuroimaging in
Relationship to Competence to Stand Trial and Insanity, in NEUROIMAGING IN
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 147, 151 (Joseph R.
Simpson ed., 2012).
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defense was based on PET (Positron Emission Tomography), SPECT scans
(Single-Photon Emission Computerized Tomography) and CT scans
(Computerized Tomography).76 Judge Weinstein sided with the opinion(s)
that the imaging studies “were not consistent with vascular dementia….”77
Far from supporting an assumption by some critics that judges and lawyers
will mistakenly be seduced by brain imaging evidence, the outcome of the
Gigante litigation supports the recognition that judges with experience in
addressing scientific methodology, who are willing to listen to a breadth of
testimony on competence issues, will be skeptical of claims of incompetence
that are not supported by persuasive evidence.
Some commentators cite the case mainly because, in the end, Mr.
Gigante admitted to obstructing the proceedings by ‘faking’ his level of
mental disorder, thus demonstrating that even well-credentialed and
celebrated mental health experts can be mistaken where evidence
undermining the incompetence claim has not been addressed.78 Others,
however, cite the case as an example of litigation in which the defense knew
the judge and government were skeptical because of the notoriety of the case
and the claim of incompetence, so the defense sought to introduce evidence
from several different evaluators, including a neuroimaging expert, in an
effort to solidify the defense’s case. In retrospect, it is clear that the
neuroimaging evidence was not unequivocally supportive of the claim of
dementia.
Clearly, part of the reason the judge did not credit the expert
testimony offered by the defense was because the government’s evidence
rebutting the showing of Mr. Gigante’s incompetence involved observations
of lay witnesses (nurses and guards), as well as chronicles about Mr.
Gigante’s behaviors and interactions while under observation in locked ward
settings.79 As a teaching tool and cautionary tale, the case is discussed as one
that demonstrates the need for attention to the ecological validity of testingbased assessments, including third party and other extensive information
(nursing notes, videos of meetings, recordings of conversations, etc.) that
76

United States v. Gigante, 996 F.Supp. 194, 220–21 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), as
amended (1998).
77
Id.
78
Kolla, supra note 75, at 151.
79
Id. at 230–38 (noting inconsistencies between certain testing results and
everyday behavior observations and results on imaging studies and psychological
testing results viewed as “inconsistent with other results” and “inadequate and
misleading.”).
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provide corroborating (or contradictory) evidence.
Another case referenced in the literature on neuroimaging and
competence assessment resulted in two differing, successive rulings.80 These
ruling were entered in United States v. Dr. Jihad Kasim, a criminal case
prosecuted in the Northern District of Indiana. The first of the Kasim rulings
(2008) has been cited in several writings as supportive of the utility of
imaging studies where the defense argues that the accused suffers from
dementia.81 The case involved charges of Medicare fraud by a board-certified
pediatrician (Dr. Kasim) who allegedly engaged in the fraud to help cover
gambling losses. Dr. Kasim’s personal medical history included documented
treatment for a myocardial infarction during the time period of the alleged
fraud and a resulting coma with what was initially found to be anoxic brain
damage. A series of medical assessments and interventions resulted in
several diagnoses that were brought to the judge’s attention to explain that
Dr. Kasim’s erratic behavior and described deficits rendered him
incompetent. While various imaging and other diagnostic procedures raised
questions about the accused’s condition, the judge was presented with
evidence from a SPECT scan that he found “demonstrated a marked decrease
in the blood flow in the front temporal lobes of Kasim’s brain.”82
On its face, the 2008 ruling indicates that evidence from varying
sources persuaded the judge that the reported deficits were sufficiently
established. The judge noted the involvement of clinical psychology,
neuroradiology, nuclear medicine, neurology, psychiatry, neuropsychology,

80

See Edersheim & Wei, supra note 69, at 96 (citing United States v. Kasim and
the order from 2008). What is missing is a citation to the 2010 order from the same
court that arrived at a different conclusion (finding the accused competent to stand
trial). As noted above, Dr. Kasim’s litigation did not end there either. Similarly, Dr.
John Meixner cites the 2008 ruling in Kasim in his highly informative above-cited
article. Meixner, supra note 62, at 1013, n.100. It does not appear that the further
2010 order is cited. These observations are not meant to criticize either of the works
just cited, though they are intended to point out that the utility of looking at the
dockets of rulings made in competence cases now that such dockets are more
generally available to lawyers, scholars, and members of the public online allow an
understanding in certain cases, such as Gigante and Kasim of the reason that
competence issues once raised in a complex case tend to be revisited.
81
See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Frances X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the
United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW 349, 355 (Tade M. Spranger ed.,
2012).
82
United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89137, at
*17 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 3, 2008).
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and neurosurgery in the evidence before the Court.83 The judge concluded in
2008 that: “Kasim’s poor judgment and lack of cooperation with defense
counsel are the result of progressive debilitating disease of dementia.”84 The
judge found Kasim incompetent to stand trial.
The 2008 order referred Dr. Kasim to a Federal Bureau of Prisons
Medical Facility where staff conducted an independent review and concluded
that Dr. Kasim appeared to them to be competent to stand trial. This
development is not unprecedented, in the sense that not infrequently an
accused initially ruled incompetent and then referred to a state facility may
either be found to be competent during further evaluations or restored to
competence during the hospital stay.
After a new hearing in 2009, the court ruled in 2010 that Dr. Kasim
was competent to stand trial. This turn of events was significant since, in
2008, the judge had noted that it appeared that Dr. Kasim might never regain
competence and that the evidence supported the view that Dr. Kasim had a
chronic debilitating condition. During the course of the 2009 hearing,
however, a board certified neurologist testified convincingly,85 opining that
“a SPECT scan had been considered an unreliable biological marker of
dementia” since 2001, based on variabilities in the patient and given issues
with the quality of the resolution of the imaging. This opinion, apparently
uncontradicted by other evidence, convinced the judge to side with the
opinion that the imaging studies “show no biological markers of frontal
temporal lobe dementia, anoxic encephalopathy, or any other neurological
brain disorder.”86
Furthermore, the judge accepted the opinion of a neuropsychologist
employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons that Dr. Kasim’s observed
behavior was inconsistent with dementia as were subsequent neurological
examinations.87 The Government also obtained recordings of phone calls
which revealed that Dr. Kasim “…was coherent, lucid, capable of analytical
thinking and planning, and able to communicate his concerns and ideas to
others.”88
Readers can certainly be excused for wondering why Gigante and
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Id. at *1–9.
Id. at *51–53.
85
Id. at *2–4.
86
Id. at *3–4.
87
Id. at *8–10.
88
Id. at *11–12.
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Kasim would be reviewed as examples of the use of neuroimaging in a
competence assessment if the outcome in both cases was a finding by a judge
that ultimately the neuroimaging evidence failed to support the opinion(s)
about the accused’s claimed incompetence. Here, it may be useful to
underscore that the definition of competence to stand trial is not one specified
by medical, psychiatric, or psychological diagnostic systems. The Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric Association,
or the International Classification of Diseases (“ICD”) published by the
World Health Organization – or other diagnostic systems used in the medical
and mental health professions – do not determine who will be ruled to be
legally competent or incompetent in a criminal case. A theme that is
introduced in the review of the two cases examined above is that when a
competence question becomes subject to a fulsome courtroom-based
examination, and where the prosecution and defense each present
‘competing’ evidence on the question of competence, there are likely to be
differing views presented—including differing views on the meaning of
pertinent neuroimaging evidence. On occasion, the evidence that seems to be
most incompatible with claims of the accused’s incompetence was the
evidence provided by reports from lay witnesses who had conversations with
the accused, recordings of interviews, or of phone calls. That said, as
discussed in the two further cases below, where the totality of evidence,
including the imaging studies, supports the basis for the weight of evaluators’
opinions, it also demonstrates the utility of the neuroimaging evidence in
supporting claims of incompetence or disability.
Where a knowledgeable court and experienced lawyers (on both
sides) are involved, there is an awareness that psychiatrists, psychologists,
neuropsychologists, behavioral neurologists, neuroradiologists, and forensic
mental health professionals of various kinds have a number of tools available
to them to assist the courts (and lawyers) in the assessment of competence to
stand trial. In the end, when the incompetence question is contested, it is a
judicial ruling that will essentially spell out the legally required
determination – and essentially will represent the judicial finding or
judicially created ‘diagnosis’ of either competence or incompetence. Where
the available neuroimaging evidence is subject to data-based criticism, as
happened in the cases just discussed, a judge is likely to find that the evidence
does not support the claim of incompetence.
Defense lawyers are well aware that the United States Supreme
Court has explained that the right to counsel in criminal cases means the right
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to effective assistance of counsel.89 One appellate court provides a reminder
of the role that counsel play in the decision-making that results in competence
inquiries:
Trial counsel and the trial court each have important roles to play in
ensuring that only competent defendants are tried.… But the court typically
only has limited contact with criminal defendants; it is not in the best position
to identify those in need of competency evaluations. Normally, it is defense
counsel who has the most exposure to the defendant’s behavior and (prior to
any expert evaluation) “the best-informed view of the defendant’s ability to
participate in his defense.”90Considering their ethical obligation to provide
legal assistance according to the prevailing standard of practice, defense
lawyers could reasonably seek advice from and consider – especially where
budgeting permits it – the involvement of as many sources of useful and
relevant information, as well as supporting or corroborating evidence, as
possible to address a pending competence question. These efforts may well
appropriately include inviting the involvement of neuroscientists and
neuroimaging tools of various kinds.
The following two cases help illustrate situations in which multidisciplinary assessments of competence conducted over a lengthy period of
time, and involving neuroimaging evidence, resulted in findings that
essentially concluded the proceedings—there was no trial of the charges in
either case because of the accused’s mental condition. One is a case litigated
in the State of Hawaii in which the court’s eventual determination was that
the accused was incompetent to stand trial and was not likely to regain the
competence to stand trial. The judge agreed that the criminal charges should
be dismissed and that the accused should be subject to a guardianship,
together with continuing confinement in a state hospital setting. The second
ruling that we examine was entered in a California state court case in which
imaging studies of the accused’s brain conducted several years into the
inquiry helped experts identify abnormal brain structure and specific
compromised brain function that solidified the basis for a finding of
incompetence and an eventual resolution of the case.
The Hawaii based adjudication involved a neuroimaging component
and extensive testimony from a number of professional disciplines, which
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See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
Blakeney v. United States, 77 A.3d 328, 342 (D.C. App. 2013) (citing Medina,
505 U.S. at 450).
90
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resulted in a 124-page trial court ruling.91 This ruling, from 2018, emerged
from an assessment process in which the combination of the State prosecutor,
the defense, and a third entity – a state hospital system or a prison hospital
system – each contributed diagnostic information, competence assessment
reports, and a breadth of expertise, which included a review of historical
imaging studies of the accused plus updated imaging studies conducted
during the progress of the competence related assessments after the accused’s
arrest.
Adam Mau was charged with violation of state law resulting from a
home invasion, kidnapping, and robberies that had left three persons dead.
Prior to the charged crimes, including the three criminal homicides, Mr. Mau
had a history of hospitalizations and periods of psychiatric treatment. Once
he was charged, the defense initiated a number of evaluations of Mr. Mau,
one of which included the reexamination, with updated software packages,
of MRI data (Magnetic Resonance Imaging data) that predated the Mau
criminal case indictment. Mr. Mau then underwent further post-arrest
structural and functional imaging studies, psychiatric assessment,
psychological assessment, neuropsychological assessments, medication
effect assessment, and competence-specific forensic assessment. In its
review of some of the evidence, the Hawaii court noted that professionals in
various disciplines generated a total of thirty-five reports between 2006 and
2016 – some through the Hawaii state hospital system, some as a result of
requests by the defense, and some order by the court.
The Mau court order chronicles an unusually lengthy period of time
devoted to the assessment of the accused Adam Mau’s competence,
including periodic assessments and hearings held during the State’s efforts
to restore Mr. Mau into competence to stand trial. The presiding judge’s
detailed finding (entered more than ten years into the pendency of the case)

91

State of Hawai’i v. Adam Mau, No. 1PC0610013931 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct. 15,
2018) (order regarding Adam Mau’s competence to stand trial and granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss indictments). The authors extend appreciation to
attorney Brook Hart, Adam Mau’s lead counsel, for his courtesy in providing case
materials. Mr. Hart had extensive experience in the defense of complex, notorious
cases, at the time he defended Adam Mau. He was able to retain the services of
examiners from Hawaii as well as the mainland, including some leading authorities
on the forensic competence assessment process in preparing defense evidence. The
court and the state involved a number of the state’s leading forensic examiners in the
case as well. Coauthor John Philipsborn served as one of several consultants to Brook
Hart during the litigation on the issue of Mr. Mau’s competence to stand trial.
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demonstrates the care with which Mr. Mau’s history was investigated so that
a wide range of information was available for the judge to consider, such as
treatment at birth for cyanosis (a brain blood oxygen deficiency) and a history
of six separate head traumas, several of which resulted in contemporaneous
medical treatment with resulting medical records. These matters were
accompanied by a history of psychiatric hospitalizations and treatments, and
pre-offense psychological and psychiatric assessments. Mr. Mau was given
prescriptions for psychotropic medications and ordered to be managed under
a formal guardianship even before his arrest in the murder case.
In part because of the extensive medical and psychiatric history, the
existence of historical (meaning pre-murder charges) structural MRI studies
led defense counsel to seek a court order permitting both Positron Emission
Tomography and further MRI examination (motions that were opposed by
the State). These were imaging studies aimed at buttressing (and further
explaining) findings arrived at during periodic neuropsychological testing.
As parties undertook litigation about the utility of further imaging studies
following Hawaii’s competence assessment procedures, a court-appointed
panel of three mental health professionals periodically evaluated Mr. Mau
and their opinions, as reflected in the court order, changed over time as
further history emerged and they received information.
Treating medical and psychiatric staff at the detention facilities
housing Mr. Mau had opportunities to observe Mr. Mau and interact with
him extensively. Even outside consultants had such opportunities. For
example, one outside evaluator was described as having spent fifty-seven
hours interviewing Mr. Mau over twenty-four separate interviews conducted
in the eight-year period between 2006 and 2014.92 That same examiner
opined that after five years of treatment with Clozaril (an antipsychotic
medication), Mr. Mau continued to produce results on competence
assessment tools administered to him (including the MacCAT-CA and
ECST-R) showing “…a substantial impairment of his rational understanding
of his legal situation and ability to assist counsel.”93
The court’s order explained that it continued to consider the periodic
‘three-panel’ evaluations conducted by the designated examiners, as well as
evidence tendered in the form of nursing summaries, reports from custodial
staff, progress notes, state hospital recovery plan related information, and the
like. During one of several periodic hearings, the court heard testimony based
92
93

Id. at 31.
Id.
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on neuropsychological testing, imaging studies, competence specific
assessment, response to medication, and hospital staff related observations.
Counsel for Mr. Mau offered information about their problematic
communications with him. The court also took into account contrary
opinions, including opinions that were linked to assessment interviews that
had been videotaped and shown to the court.94
The court acknowledged the salience of the information provided by
experts with extensive experience in imaging studies as to how this
information intertwined with facts gleaned from the neuropsychological
assessment sessions psychiatrists had performed over a period of years. The
growing data base supported the view that it was unlikely that Mr. Mau could
be restored to competence.95
Admittedly, the trajectory of Adam Mau in the State of Hawaii’s
criminal court and mental health systems can be considered unusual in
comparison to the level of care shown by many state trial courts in
competence assessment situations. The Mau case generally fits the definition
of a complex case involving allegations of serious crimes and the potential
for an extended sentence, in which the claim of incompetence required
extensive attempts at evaluation and restoration to competence before the
final order dismissing the case and referring Mr. Mau to a mental health
guardianship in a hospital setting was reached. The State of Hawaii does not
employ the death penalty, but Mr. Mau was eligible for life sentence(s). This
was a case with serious sentencing consequences. Mr. Mau, as have others
who have been able to seek the services of a wide range of experts, had access
to financial resources, and was in a state that has a well-developed procedure
for competence assessments. The state court was also willing to conduct
careful reviews of the case episodically, thanks in part to Mr. Mau’s
representation by a robust defense team, led by highly accomplished lead
counsel with experience in complex case defense involving mental condition
issues.
The final exemplar discussed here arose in California and was
litigated in the San Francisco Superior Court.96 Jehad Baqleh was a San
94

Id. at 86 (reviewing the court’s account of its viewing of video interviews).
Id. at 48 (relating impairments found through neuropsychological assessment
over a period of years to the left frontotemporal region of the brain).
96
See, e.g., People v. Baqleh, No. 183548 (Cal. Super. Ct.). The case resulted in
95
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Francisco taxicab driver who was arrested and prosecuted for the rape,
robbery, and murder of a young female passenger. As in the above-referenced
Mau case, the inquiries into Mr. Baqleh’s mental condition and competence
occurred over a period of years. By the time the contested evidentiary
hearings on competence took place for a second time - some ten years into
the pendency of the case and following Mr. Baqleh’s hospitalization in a state
hospital - there were thirteen assessment reports and numerous interview
records and considerable other materials descriptive of Mr. Baqleh’s
background, historical behavior, impairments, and diagnoses available for
review by examiners.97 The court heard evidence from various
neuropsychological, psychiatric, and forensic competence examiners,
including by court-appointed examiners who conducted examinations while
the accused was in jail. Psychiatrists and psychologists also had examined
Mr. Baqleh in state hospitals where he received treatment in an attempt to
restore competence.
During the second set of hearings on competence, the trial court
received a number of reports from individuals who were directly involved in
the trial preparation, including a report from an experienced lawyer who had
ceased practicing law to become a licensed private investigator and
mitigation specialist. This person had an unusual blend of professional
training and experience that allowed her to provide informed perspectives
about the implications of Mr. Baqleh’s deficits and limitations when defense
team members attempted to confer with Mr. Baqleh to discuss the case and
the prospects of trial. The deficits in question were tied directly to Mr.
Baqleh’s inadequate capacity for rational communication with his counsel,
and to his inability to assist in his defense given his demonstrated
impairments.
The defense offered evidence of incompetence linked to cognitive
disorders, impairments in episodic memory, and difficulties in language

at least one published opinion from the California Court of Appeal which reviewed
procedures under which a court ordered examination of Mr. Baqleh could take place.
Baqleh v. Super. Ct., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). Lead counsel for
Mr. Baqleh, Michael Burt, is a lawyer who has gained a national reputation for his
knowledgeable and sophisticated lawyering of Federal and State capital cases. He
has been involved in numerous cases involving novel questions about scientific and
technical evidence. Mr. Burt is regularly involved in the training of lawyers who
defend death penalty cases.
97
One examiner listed ninety-seven different categories of records and materials
made available for him to review prior to a 2008 hearing.
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processing. Because of the disagreements between the state’s experts and the
defense’s experts, several years into the competence litigation, it was
recommended that Mr. Baqleh be sent for neuroimaging studies at a
University of California hospital. Structural and functional imaging was
performed using differing techniques, resulting in an unusual finding that
appeared to correlate with a history of reported cognitive disorder and
learning disabilities. Based on the imaging and additional evidence of areas
of brain injury, doctors opined that Mr. Baqleh suffered from colpocephaly,
a cephalic disorder causing brain structure malformations that are associated
with a variety of neurological syndromes and disorders.98 The imaging
studies provided some explanation for the deficits that had been described
through forensic psychiatric, neuropsychological, and psychological
evaluations. The results of the imaging studies provided both the parties and
a wide variety of state and defense physicians and mental health experts
staffing the case for the State and defense with evidence that there were
genuine, resident, and chronic issues with Mr. Baqleh’s cognitive functions
that warranted a mental health basis to resolve the case, resulting in a
commitment of Mr. Baqleh to a state hospital.

VIII.
LAWYERING AND FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE WILL CALL FOR PRACTITIONERS TO CONSIDER
NEUROSCIENCE AND ITS TOOLS IN COMPETENCE ASSESSMENTS
A recent survey of literature on neuroscience evidence in the United
States and other common law courts noted “the use of neuroscientific
evidence as buttressing…, detecting…, or sorting devices….”99
Neuroscience appears to most often be offered either as one of the methods
of detecting a cause, or as an explanation of an otherwise observed,
documented, and assessed deficit or injury. Also, such evidence, including
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Jacob Landman et al., Radiological Colpocephaly: A Congenital
Malformation or the Result of Intrauterine and Perinatal Brain Damage, 11 BRAIN
& DEV. 313 (1989).
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Darby Aono et al., Neuroscientific Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review, 4
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IMPLICATIONS
1,
4
(2019),
https://canlab.yale.edu/sites/default/files/Aono_2019_neuroscience_courtroom_revi
ew.pdf (referencing Owen Jones, Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law, in
NEUROSCIENCES AND THE HUMAN PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
ACTIVITIES 181 (Antonio Battro et al., ed. 2013)).
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neuroimaging, is offered to buttress a claim of disorder, deficit, or, as
pertinent here, of incompetence, which is also rooted in findings made
through other means (neuropsychology, neuropsychiatry, forensic testing
assessment, etc.).
For lawyers and courts, it is of some significance that claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel have been tethered to allegations of
inadequate consideration or presentation of neuroscience evidence. In other
words, neuroscience and neuroimaging are sufficiently established as
scientific and technical endeavors that may inform decision-making in U.S.
courts that lawyers should address these areas of science in professionally
adequate and legally defensible ways where such evidence may be warranted
or is actually presented.100
A review of the cases discussed above presents lawyers and judges
with examples of competence adjudications in which several different types
of evidence and expertise were presented. In three of the four examples,
neuroimaging evidence was offered as a buttress. In the fourth of the cases
(Baqleh), it was offered in the category of a ‘detection’ tool, which allowed
“the use of neuroscience to gain otherwise elusive insights, such as the extent
of brain injuries….”101
Neuroscientists and some legal scholars have sounded words of
caution about mistaken and cynical uses of neuroscience evidence in
courtrooms. There are varying viewpoints on the level of contribution that
brain imaging and other techniques can make in informing judges and juries
about a given individual’s claimed disorders and deficits, particularly as a
means of identifying the cause of specific behavior.102 It may be that lawyers
can be faulted in specific litigation for ‘overselling’ the utility of particular
neuroimaging or other neuroscience-based studies. But, at the present time,
a combination of the working definition of professionally adequate lawyering
of a competence to stand trial issue and the competence-related practice

100

Id.
Id. at 4.
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See, e.g., Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words?
Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 239, 240 (2007) (contrasting
scientists to lawyers, explaining: “Lawyers, unlike scientists, are advocates, and
therefore operate within a different paradigm.”). On one hand, these coauthors make
the useful point that lawyers are advocating for a client by marshaling available facts.
On the other, as a variety of litigation has demonstrated, learned, accomplished, and
celebrated scientists can have differing views of and claim different levels of support
for what are claimed to be scientific methodologies, diagnoses, and research.
101
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assessment guidelines, literature, and existing case law, supports the view
that lawyers should seek consultation and advice on the tools and techniques
associated with neuroscience from examiners involved in a competence
assessment. If there is pre-existing imaging or other neuroscience related
information in a case (as covered in the AAPL Guidelines (2007) and
exemplified in the above-described Mau litigation, lawyers should obtain
information about the utility of that information, and the advisability of
obtaining additional imaging or related evidence. Whether to actually employ
neuroimaging or other specialized neuroscience evidence will remain a
matter of case-specific professional judgment.

CONCLUSION
The effort here has included a review of pertinent literature, some of
which has yet to find its way into the discussion of neuroscience and law.
Neuroimaging evidence has been considered in competence adjudications
prior to the more recent attention to neuroscience and law literature over the
past fifteen years. In part because it is the responsibility of courts to ensure
that the accused in a criminal case is competent to stand trial, judges and
lawyers should share information about competency. A review of published
cases from federal and state reviewing courts demonstrates the
acknowledgement that there can be a variety of reasons that a competence
question is raised in a criminal case. Clearly, courts have an interest in
attempting to sort out genuine, compelling claims of incompetence from
those that are not supported by the evidence. Some courts – including those
discussed above in the case studies – have shown an interest in permitting
wide-ranging evidence on a claim of incompetence. It is clear from examples
discussed here that judges do not necessarily credit the more prestigious
experts or the side that happens to introduce neuroimaging or other
neuroscience evidence. The incentive is for the parties in well-researched and
litigated matters to present multiple sources of information to address the
issue, and this may call for a neuroscientist’s expertise, even where
neuroimaging is not specifically informative.
It continues to be pointed out that courts and lawyers may lack the
training and familiarity with the intersection between the neurosciences and
law to even be aware of the utility of neuroscience. Efforts continue to
remedy that deficit, and it may be that the increased proliferation of literature
and training opportunities will serve to increase the quality and reliability of
competence assessment going forward.

